WTO, PATENTS AND EFFECT ON PHARMACEUTICALS IN THE CITY OF PUNE
The research will be particular in Pune City, India with emphasis on WTO from such product patent regime as new patent regime that the city focuses. The knowing of Trips (The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) ACT in reference to Pune region pharmaceuticals and basically to find out the effects of Trips ACT with relevance to literature studies forming in desirable research information through case study approach, it is of narrative inquiry that assume case study surveys to be given at small, medium and large scale pharmaceuticals in Pune, India. The research study will comprise of several statements relating to such patent regime of the region from where there is awareness to research patterns in comprehensive stature of literature concerning WTO, patent effects, Trips ACT and related points significant for research. Interpretation and statement response analysis will be important noting in TRIPs behavior of pharmaceutical firms at Pune in respect of technology acquisition, knowledge transfer and domestic research development in India. The pharmaceutical multinationals are placed to control knowledge diffusion and integrate the local capabilities of country like India into their own myopic and narrowly benefiting innovation strategies.
Evidence available from the experience of developing countries like India on the diffusion of knowledge contradicts the claim of TRIPs advocates that its adverse effect on prices of patented medicines would be compensated by benefits of technology transfer and research development. The core question implies to, what are Trips ACT effect on small pharma and large as well medium scale pharma? Thus, knowing in such implications of Trips agreement is ideal in this research, as well as recognizing in standards that might integrate such information regarding patent regime of pharmaceuticals at Pune region. Addressing questions in particular context of Indian pharmaceutical industry simulating effects of introducing patent protection for pharmaceutical products, required by the WTO Agreement on TRIPS, study's findings need to be considered in connection with government policies on price controls and compulsory licenses. Such policies are ignored in the analysis, but they may have important implications for market structure and consumer welfare. Nonetheless, the findings may serve as reference points for countries introducing stronger patent rights, in view of their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement (Abbott, 2001). The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is the most important as well as the most controversial instrument to date concerning intellectual property protection. What is not clear is the impact it will have on Pune city and whether it will actually meet its objective in promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology of pharmaceuticals in the region.
Some proponents of patent regime argue that strengthening patent protection will lead to greater technology transfer in Pune and inflow of foreign direct investment as it is the most important channel for technology transfer. The research takes the Indian pharmaceutical industry particular case assimilation at Pune from examining research assertion, arguing that enhancing patent protection may not outcome result in corresponding increase in Trips notion in the Indian pharmaceutical sector. There shows that strong patent protection, there are equally important factors that have bearing on the inflow of Trips ACT. The significant adverse implications so that there advancing Pune into product patent regime as being provided under the TRIPs agreement. World Trade Organization members are required to enforce product patents for pharmaceuticals in the region. There will have to investigate Trips effects at Pune by using literature based data for case survey segments in adherence to Indian pharmaceuticals market. The effects of TRIPS may have some basis such as withdrawal of domestic product being associated with substantial welfare losses to the Indian economy (Subramanian, 1995).
The methodology will question soundness of certain policies. Pune may have few intellectual property protections for pharmaceuticals, which may have resulted in part from an acute collective action problem, Pune reap full benefits from lower prices when they do not create pharmaceutical patents, yet the costs in terms of diminished research incentives are largely externalized to the rest of the developing world. The magnitude of the effect may be modest for many lines of drug research. The WTO TRIPs agreement held out some promise of overcoming part of problem, but just as the obligations of India under TRIPs were beginning to take hold, on future credibility of patent rights for pharmaceuticals at Pune. Attempting to measure the importance of Trips effects in context of pharmaceutical research aside, using case survey data from such pharmaceuticals at Pune city, at most three as there explanation of significant fraction in research productivity, there statements about nature of WTO competencies and ways in which Trips have positive assumption for pharmaceuticals at Pune. The effective patent life is lost in pharmaceuticals because of the lengthy time periods required for clinical trials and regulatory approval upon performing simulation analyses on how proposed legislative reforms would impact on innovative drugs in the region. Studies have found patents are significantly more important to pharmaceutical firms in appropriating the benefits from innovation compared with other high tech industries. The reason is because the costs of drug innovation are very high while the costs of imitation are relatively low.
Abbott, FM., 2001, "The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference", Occasional Paper 7, Geneva: Quaker United Nations Office
Subramanian, A., 1995, "Putting Some Numbers on the TRIPS Pharamceutical Debate," International Journal of Technology Management10 (2/3), pp. 252-268.
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